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a  b  s t  r a  c t
The ornamental  plant trade has  been  identified  as  a key  introduction pathway  for  plant  pathogens. Estab-
lishing effective  biosecurity measures  to reduce  the  risk of plant pathogen  outbreaks  in  the  live plant  trade
is therefore  important.  Management  of invasive  pathogens  has  been identified as a weakest  link public
good, and thus  is reliant  on  the  actions of individual private agents. This  paper therefore  provides an  anal-
ysis of the  impact  of the  private agents’  biosecurity  decisions  on pathogen  prevention  and control within
the  plant  trade. We model  the  impact that  an infectious  disease  has  on  a plant nursery  under  a  constant
pressure of potentially  infected  input plant  materials, like seeds  and saplings, where  the spread  of the
disease  reduces  the  value  of mature plants.  We explore  six scenarios  to understand  the  influence of three
key  bioeconomic  parameters;  the  disease’s  basic reproductive  number,  the  loss  in value  of a  mature  plant
from  acquiring an  infection and the  cost-effectiveness  of restriction.  The results characterise  the  disease
dynamics  within the  nursery and  explore  the  trade-offs  and  synergies between the  optimal  level  of efforts
on restriction  strategies (actions to  prevent buying  infected  inputs),  and  on  removal  of infected  plants  in
the  nursery.  For  diseases  that can  be  easily  controlled,  restriction  and  removal are substitutable  strategies.
In  contrast, for highly infectious  diseases,  restriction  and removal are  often  found  to be  complementary,
provided that  restriction is cost-effective  and  the  optimal  level  of removal  is non-zero.
©  2016 The Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier B.V. This is an open  access article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Increases in the movement of people and traded goods as a  consequence of globalisation have led to growing concerns about the threat
posed by invasive species. especially invasive pathogens of humans, plants and animals (e.g. Anderson et al., 2004; Waage and Mumford,
2008; Perrings et al., 2010; Hulme, 2014; Dalmazzone and Giaccaria, 2014). Recent disease outbreaks in plants, such as the Chalara fungus
(Hymenoscyphus pseudoalbidus)  affecting ash trees across Europe (Pautasso et al., 2013) and the oomycete Phytophthora ramorum affecting
many plants including larch in  Europe (Brasier and Webber, 2010)  and oaks in the US (Rizzo et al., 2002), have focused attention on the
policy options to reduce the risks of similar plant disease outbreaks occurring in the future, and the management options to  reduce damage
from newly established pathogen populations. These disease outbreaks have also raised concerns about patterns of plant trade, which has
been identified as a key introduction pathway for invasive pathogens (Santini et al., 2013), and on the need for a more prominent role of
the private sector in biosecurity practices to  mitigate existing risk (Liebhhold et al., 2012).  Understanding the economic impacts of  damage
and mitigation is essential for determining optimal policy and management options for invasive pathogens (Stohlgren and Schnase, 2006).
The body of the literature that combines invasion ecology with economic analysis to deal with these issues has drastically increased
in the last decade (for an overview see Olson, 2006; Marbuah et al., 2014). Bioeconomic studies explore the management problem from a
central authority perspective, focusing on the potential social welfare benefits from policy intervention to limit the risk of invasive species
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1904  324769.
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damages using instruments that include port inspections, quarantine and import tariffs (McAusland and Costello, 2004; Mérel and Carter,
2008), import risk screening programmes (Keller and Springborn, 2014; Springborn et al., 2015), the use of public funds to detect, eradicate
and/or control established invaders, and habitat restoration (e.g. Olson and Roy, 2002; Mehta et al., 2007; Sims and Finnoff, 2013). Other
studies have examined the trade-off between preventive measures before the arrival and control measures after the invader is known to
be in the country in order to determine the optimal allocation of limited public resources between these two strategies (e.g. Leung et al.,
2002, 2005; Finnoff et al., 2005, 2007; Haight and Polasky, 2010; Sanchirico et al., 2010) Here we  add  to  this literature by adopting a  private
sector perspective, in order to understand the biosecurity vulnerability and management incentives affecting individual businesses.
One of the challenges for developing policy to reduce the risk of outbreaks of pathogens is  the fact that the potential routes of  invasion
are not only diverse, but also that they are controlled by  a  mixture of public and private agents. Trading decisions made by private decision-
makers may  have significant implications for public interest at a  regional or national level, but the public costs of an outbreak are likely
to far exceed the costs experienced by  any one private business, and a  privately optimal trading decision is very unlikely to match the
publicly optimal one due to potential conflicting interests (Perrings et al., 2005; Mills et al., 2011). Effective control of the risk posed by
invasive pest and diseases has been defined as a ‘weakest-link’ public good (e.g. Perrings et al., 2002; Burnett, 2005). Therefore, the risk of
outbreak can be in  the hands of a  single private firm in  the trading network. This can limit the level of success of decentralised biosecurity
efforts, although it may  also allow the firm to take a  leadership role, creating incentives for other firms to  take action (Hennessy, 2008).
This paper studies the relationship between prevention and control strategies in  the context of plant trade. We  take a  single nursery
perspective in order to understand the biosecurity vulnerability and incentives affecting private firms, that can inform subsequent analysis
on networks and policy development. We develop a  simple bioeconomic model of a private nursery owner who buys in,  grows and sells
on plants in the face of the threats posed by  an infectious pathogen. The management options available to the nursery owner are some
combination of (1) restriction, i.e. prevention measures to reduce the number of infected plant materials coming from input sources (for
example, inspecting inputs and/or investigating and discriminating input suppliers based on perceived cleanliness) and (2) removal, i.e.
taking out infected plants within the nursery. Other means of management like cleanliness and fungicide use are assumed to  at constant
optimal levels.
Prior bioeconomic research on the plant trade has focused on its role as a significant pathway to the introduction of potentially exotic
invasive plants, exploring the use of taxes or annual license fee to  reduce this risk and cover the expected environmental damages (Knowler
and Barbier, 2005; Barbier et al., 2011). However, implementing these market-based instruments is  challenging due to the lack of  support
among stakeholders in  the industry (Barbier et al., 2013; Touza et al., 2014). In this paper, we  follow current research on private biosecurity
responses to livestock diseases, where disease risk does not only depend on agents’ choices but also is characterised by an underlying
epidemiological dynamics (Horan et al., 2010). In this framework, (Horan and Fenichel, 2007) are concerned on the management problem
characterised by livestock-wildlife interactions in  disease transmission; and (Gramig and Horan, 2011) studied the role of government
policies as regular testing on encouraging farmers’ biosecurity investments. More recently, (Horan et al., 2015) focused on assessing whether
trade always increase risk or whether it can act as a  disease management mechanism.
Our focus, however, is  the threat associated with private trading decisions, as infected goods can be bought in  and sold on. We  contribute
to the above work by focusing on plant trade, and addressing the role of both private preventing and controlling behaviour to limit disease
transmission risk characterised by epidemiological dynamics. Thus, we examine the potential trade-offs and synergies between these
management decisions when the nursery owner’s objective is  to  minimise the expected private costs from infection management and
revenue losses associated with the reduced value of infected plants. We find that if the disease spreads faster than the ability to  control the
disease, removal and restriction complement each other whereas if the disease is  controllable, removal and restriction become substitutes.
2. Model derivation
2.1. Disease dynamics
We  consider a  plant nursery with a nursery owner who  constantly buys plant material, grows it and sells it on when the plant becomes
mature (i.e. reaches a  target age). A disease is introduced within the input plant material and spreads within the nursery. For simplicity
and generality, we assume that the plant population is  split into two classes, susceptible plants (S) and infected plants (I). Infected plants
can infect susceptible plants, and once infected a  plant remains infected for the rest of its time in the nursery; there is  no recovery from
the infection.1 The consequence of infection for the nursery owner is  that infection alters (assumed here to reduce) the net price obtained
from selling of a mature plant.
To combat the spread of the infection within the nursery, the nursery owner has two different control measures. The owner can invest
(i) in restriction to reduce the proportion of infected inputs (be it from inspecting inputs and rejecting infected plants or by  selecting
suppliers with less infected material); and (ii) in the removal of infected plants within the nursery. Removal reduces the time an infected
plant stays in the nursery, avoiding additional secondary invasions, but  provides no revenue.
Schematically, the plant-disease dynamics can be described as (see Fig. 1):
Change in S = Input of S − Output of S − Disease Transmission,
Change in I = Input of I − Output of I − Removal of I +  Disease Transmission.
For simplicity, we assume that the stock of plants at the nursery is fixed, N, which may  mean for example that the nursery is  always
full (this is a simplifying assumption that is not necessarily realistic; we address this in  Section 4). To do this, we  set Total Input = Total
Output + Removal, where Output of S = ıS and Output of I =  ıI, where ı is  the rate of plants become mature and sold off (i.e. plants stay
1 Although there is  no recovery, infected plants can leave the system via being sold on or being removed and be replaced by a susceptible plant. This means there is some
kind  of pseudo-recovery, meaning the system behaves more like a classic SIS system than SI.
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Fig. 1. A transfer diagram representing the disease dynamics within the nursery.
for an expected time of ı−1 in the absence of removal).2 This means instantaneous replacement of any removed plant is assumed; when
something is either sold or removed by  control, it is  immediately replaced to keep the stock at nursery constant. We also set removal
as proportional to the infected plant stock, i.e.  removal of I  =  uremI,  where urem is removal control effort (with units of removal effort per
infected plant per unit time). We  will assume that urem is bounded between 0 and uremmax,  the maximum possible effort spent on removal.
Incorporating this, we have:
Total Input = ı(S + I) +  uremI. (1)
This input is split between susceptible and infected plants; p(uins) is the proportion of plant inputs that are infected (as a  function of
restriction effort per unit time uins,  which is  a  control variable) and thus (1 − p(uins)) is  the proportion of plant inputs that are susceptible.
Incorporating the control measures into standard SI equations (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927; Anderson and May, 1991; Britton,
2003), and assuming density dependent transmission (ˇSI), we get:
dS
dt
= (1 − p(uins))(ı(S + I) +  uremI) − ıS − ˇSI, (2)
dI
dt
= p(uins)(ı(S + I) +  uremI) −  ıI −  uremI  + ˇSI. (3)
Given the assumption of constant total plant stock at the nursery (S +  I  =  N), we can reduce the system down to  one equation by substi-
tution S = N − I. We  can also rescale the infected population by the total population and consider disease prevalence, i = I/N, the proportion
of infected plants in  the population (0 ≤ i ≤ 1).
Then we get:
di
dt
=
1
N
dI
dt
= p(uins)(ı + uremi) −  ıi − uremi +  ˇN(1 − i)i. (4)
Furthermore, we rescale time by  ı−1,  the expected time a susceptible plant stays in  the nursery. Consequently, (=ıt) is  the number of
generations. Thus:
di
d
= p(uins)(1 + uˆremi) −  i − uˆremi +  R0(1 − i)i, (5)
where uˆrem = uremı−1,  the removal effort per plant generation (which is bounded above by uˆremmax = uremmaxı−1),  and R0 = ˇNı
−1, the basic
reproductive number, the expected number of secondary infections from a single infected plant over the lifespan of the infected plant in
the nursery in an otherwise wholly susceptible plant stock. The basic reproductive number is  fundamental to  whether a disease will spread
and is discussed in Section 3.
As mentioned previously, the proportion of plants brought into the nursery being infected (p(uins)) is a  function of restriction (uins). We
assume that the proportion of infected plant inputs has the following properties:
• p(uins)  is a continuously differentiable function of the restriction effort uins.
• With no restriction of plant inputs (uins = 0), some proportion of infected plants, a, will enter the nursery, i.e. p(0) =  a where a ∈ (0, 1].
• With any finite restriction effort, some proportion of infected plant will enter the nursery, i.e. p(uins)  > 0 for all finite uins.  This means
that it is not possible to completely stop infected inputs from arriving no matter how high the level of effort, be it from the difficulty to
recognise asypmtomatic infected inputs, or  machine and human error.
2 Another approach is to have assume that infected plants stay longer in the nursery due to slower growth. However, this  approach would ultimately lead to  the same
reduction in revenue, since revenue is price × output. Consequently, the only real difference would be that different output rates would lead to  a more complex replacement
term.
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Fig. 2. Proportion of infected plant inputs, p(uins), where p(uins) = (a − b)exp(−duins) +  b with a  =  0.2, b =  0  and various of values of d.  The solid lines are values used in Scenarios
found  in Section 3.
• For all restriction efforts, increasing restriction effort reduces the proportion of infected plant entering the nursery, i.e. p(uins) is  a
monotonically decreasing function of uins (equivalently,
dp
duins
≤ 0 everywhere).
Any function that is (a) continuous, (b) bounded below (by zero in this case) and (c) monotonically decreasing, must converge to  some
limit as uins goes to infinity. We  denote this limit b,  the proportion of inputs that are infected when unlimited restriction effort is used,
where b ∈ [0, a]. A  simple candidate that satisfies all of these characteristics is p(uins) =  (a  − b) exp(−duins) +  b,  is plotted in  Fig. 2 for various
values of d, where d can be interpreted as the effort-effectiveness of the restriction measures, i.e. the reduction in  the proportion of infected
plant inputs per unit of restriction effort.
2.2.  Bioeconomic model
We  consider a price-taking representative nursery owner who  seeks to maximise profit, faced with the impact of an infectious plant
disease. In our model, two types of outputs are taken into account: fully matured susceptible and infected plants with PS and PI representing
the unit net price of those outputs, respectively.3 We assume that  PI < PS since the infection would likely decrease the plants value when
mature and could incur higher production costs.4 The dynamics of the proportion of infected plants within the nursery is given by Eq.
(5). In addition, we assume that disease symptoms become more apparent as infected plants mature. This, together with an assumption
of a regime of inspections within the nursery (inspection regime is independent of the state of the nursery, i.e. a constant cost  and thus
can be ignored), leads to the nursery owner having good knowledge of which plants are infected and so can act accordingly if desired. All
the mature plants sold, or those subject to removal control, are  immediately replaced given a  constant price Pin of plant inputs. This is
consistent with our earlier assumption of constant stock within the nursery.
We also consider the costs of removing infected plants and undertaking restrictions measures to  prevent buying infected input plant
material. The cost of removing infected plants should increase both with the number of infected plants and with the removing control
effort, urem. Consequently, we will assume for simplicity that  the cost of removing infected plant is linearly dependent on the number of
infected plants and to prevent the unfeasible case of unbounded removal control effort, we will set a maximal value of removal control
effort of uremmax. Similarly, the cost of the restriction regime is  proportional to  the restriction effort uins, assumed to be dominated by  fixed
costs and thus is independent from the level of removal effort and number of infected plants (i.e. there is no additional cost from restricting
measures when buying input material to replace the removed infected plants).
The management decision problem is to maximise the present value profits by selecting the level of control in restriction and removal
measures over the time horizon T  and is  characterised by the optimising equation:
max
uins,urem
Profit =
∫ T
0
Discounting︷︸︸︷
e−rt (
Revenue from  selling S︷︸︸︷
PSıS +
Revenue from  selling I︷︸︸︷
PIıI −
Purchase of replacement stock︷ ︸︸  ︷
Pin(ıN + uremI) −
Cost of removing︷ ︸︸  ︷
cremuremI −
Cost of restriction︷  ︸︸ ︷
cinsuins )dt (6)
subject to Eqs. (2) and (3) where urem ∈ [0, uremmax]  and uins ≥ 0,  and where r  is the discount rate. Eq.  (6) is very amenable to  analytic
techniques around static solutions if  we  focus on the terms within the brackets. This means ignoring the discounting terms and the effects
around terminal and initial conditions by assuming the terminal time is large enough for dynamics solution to have converged to the
static solution. These static solutions will be the focus of this paper. Appendix C demonstrates that taking the Hamiltonian approach with
optimal conditions used in much of the economic literature (using Pontryagin’s maximum principle Pontryagin, 1987)  and then assume
constant controls, will arrive at the same optimality conditions, perturbed by a  term proportional to  the discount rate (which is  rescaled
to rˆ = r
ı
). This discounting perturbation should be negligibly small since plant nurseries usually keep plants for a  few months, possibly up
to a couple of years.
3 We  assume a fixed price for plant outputs and inputs for simplicity. However, it has been  suggested that nurseries work under monopolistic competition (Barbier et al.,
2011).
4 A few diseases can be beneficial, e.g. mild  infestations of Botrytis cinerea on grapes results in noble rot, which is desirable for dessert wines; in such cases where PI >  PS ,
the  optimal control is always to do nothing, which is  trivial.
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Taking the static problem, and rescaling parameters and variables in  (6) as for (5),  we  get:
max
uˆins,uˆrem
PS(1  − i) +  PI i − Pin(1 + uˆremi) − cremuˆremi − uˆins (7)
subject to Eq.  (5) where uˆrem = uremı−1 ∈ [0, uˆremmax]  (as before), uˆremmax = uremmaxı−1 and uˆins = cinsuins(ıN)
−1
).
Note that uins has been rescaled to uˆins, which now represents restriction control costs (with units of restriction cost per plant in  nursery
per unit time). Thus, we need to  define the proportion of infected inputs as a  function of this rescaled restriction control cost. For the
case p(uins) = (a − b) exp(−duins) +  b,  as pˆ(uˆins) = (a − b) exp(−dˆuˆins) + b where dˆ =  dıNc
−1
ins
such that pˆ(uˆins) =  p(uins). Here dˆ represents the
cost-effectiveness of restriction efforts, i.e. the reduction in  the proportion of infected inputs per dollar invested in  restricting measures.
Given some terms are constant and thus have no influence on the optimised solution, we can simplify slightly and gather terms in  the
objective function (7) to  arrive at
max
uˆins,uˆrem
⎛
⎜⎝
revenue lost  from infecteds︷  ︸︸  ︷
PI − PS −
costs of removing and  replacing infecteds︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Pin + crem)uˆrem
⎞
⎟⎠ i −
restriction costs︷︸︸︷
uˆins. (8)
Eq. (8) can be  simplified further by setting L : =  PS− PI and C : = Pin + crem.  Therefore, L is the loss incurred from selling a  mature infected
plant instead of a  mature susceptible plant, whereas C is the total cost of removing which includes both the expenses associated with the
removal and replacement of an infected plant. Using this notation, it becomes clear that the nursery owner management problem consists
of minimising the loss in  revenue due to selling infected plants and the costs of management (removal and restriction). To simplify notation
further, we will henceforth remove all the hats (i.e. set uˆrem as urem, uˆins as  uins, pˆ(uˆins) as p(uins) and dˆ as d). Consequently, the nursery
management decision is  to choose between the two  control strategies to minimise these costs of the infection,
min
uins,urem
Q :=  (L + Curem)i + uins (9)
subject to
di
d
= p(uins)(1 + uremi)  − i − uremi + R0(1  − i)i, (10)
where uins ≥ 0 and urem ∈ [0, uremmax].
2.3. Analysis
We  start the analysis of the system (9) and (10) by  looking at the long term disease dynamics for a given constant control regime. We
compare the case where restriction is perfect, i.e. all plant inputs are  susceptible (p(uins) = 0) with a  case where restriction is  imperfect,
i.e. some plant inputs are infected (p(uins) >  0). Following this, we  derive the necessary conditions describing optimal level of effort in
restriction and removal strategies, using the equilibrium found in  Section 3.1.2.  Subsequently, we demonstrate some of the theoretical
results with numerical solutions. For  simplicity, we will focus on exploring how the optimal level of management changes with respect to
changes in key parameters: the basic reproductive number (R0), the loss in revenue from selling an infected mature plant (L) and the cost-
effectiveness (d)  (the decay in the proportion of infected plant inputs per dollar spent in  restriction efforts) and keep all other parameters
fixed. This means, as a  baseline, we assume that (i) the background level of infection within the input plant material is a = 0.2, so the disease
is widespread within the traded plant material; (ii) it is possible to restrict all infected inputs with unlimited restriction b = 0,  and (iii) the
cost of removing and replacing an infected is  set at C = 10. The nursery’s maximum level of effort on removal is assumed to take any value
up to uremmax = 6.
For the basic reproductive number, we  will consider two  cases, R0 = 0.5 (i.e. the disease cannot spread within the nursery, Scenario
1) and R0 = 5 (i.e. the disease spreads fast within the nursery, Scenario 2). Although the value of R0 will depend on the characteristics of
the particular disease and the plant, given that established human diseases can have values up to the mid  teens (measles has a  value of
R0 = 12–18) and that many human diseases have basic reproductive numbers in the realms of 5 (Anderson and May, 1991), values of R0
have rarely been found in plants diseases. Even though, one study has found that R0 is of the order of 50 for wheat stripe rust in  large wheat
fields (Mikaberidze et al., 2014). Moreover, the values of R0 is  a  factor that depends not only on disease traits, but also on the properties of
the nursery. For example, actions like  the routine application of fungicides, the routine cleaning of equipment or  the arranging the nursery
to limit contact between plants could lower R0.  Consequently, one could consider Scenario 1 as the case where the nursery has effective
cleanliness whereas Scenario 2 is  where there is a lack of effective cleanliness.
For the loss of revenue from selling an infected plant, we consider a  value of L =  10 as our baseline, which implies that the costs of
removal are the same as the losses made from selling an infected plant; this would be compared to scenarios with smaller values for L, in
particular, in Scenario 1b, L =  5 and in Scenario 2b, L =  1. It is  reasonable to assume that smaller values of L would correspond to  situations
where the diseased plants have superficial damage and/or there are secondary markets for infected plant outputs with little difference
in the net price of healthy mature plants. Higher values of L correspond to diseases that have a  large impact on the net price of a highly
valuable plant, without an effective secondary market for infected plants. In particular, plants with that take a long time to mature or
bespoke plants sold  to  the landscape sector tend to  sell for higher prices and thus prone to large losses from infection.
Lastly, for the cost-effectiveness parameter, we consider d =  1 as the baseline. d = 1 corresponds with a  (1 −  exp−1) × 100%(≈63%) reduc-
tion in the proportion of infected plants coming into the nursery (p(uins)) with an additional unit in restriction (solid red line in Fig. 2). For
comparison, we assume d = 0.3  for scenarios where the disease is costly to restrict (Scenario 1c and 2c). Using d = 0.3 corresponds with a
(1 − exp−0.3) × 100%(≈26%) reduction in  p(uins)  when the restriction costs increase by one unit (solid blue line in  Fig. 2). Traits of systems
where d is large are where it is  easy to  detect infected plant inputs, because either the inputs have symptoms that can be  spotted by eye or
there exist diagnostic technology that is  cheap, quick and easy to use. On the other hand, traits of systems where d  is  small are measures
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Table  1
The Scenarios and their key results.
Scenario R0 L d ↓p Optimal result
1a 0.5 10 1  63%  Maximum removal with restriction
1b  0.5 5 1  63%  No removal with restriction
1c  0.5 10 0.3  26%  Maximum removal, no restriction
2a  5 10 1  63%  ‘Do nothing’ if uremmax  3.5, else maximum removal with restriction
2b  5 1 1  63%  ‘Do nothing’ is optimal everywhere
2c  5 10 0.3  26%  ‘Do nothing’ if uremmax  4.75, else maximum removal with restriction
Here, ‘↓p’ is the reduction of infected inputs from an increase in costs of restriction in one unit (i.e. (1−  exp(−d)) ×  100 % rounded to  the nearest percentage point). ‘Do nothing’
means zero removal and zero restriction.
Fig. 3. Perfect restriction (p = 0). (a) If Rrem
0
=
R0
1+urem
> 1, then the prevalence equation is negative for all positive prevalence. There is one non-negative steady state, i* = 0,
which  is stable. then the prevalence equation is a form of logistic growth. There are two steady states (where di
d
), i* = 0  and i∗ = 1 − 1
Rrem
0
. i =  0  is  unstable and that for the
region between i  = 0 and i = 1 − 1
Rrem
0
, di
d
> 0  and thus disease prevalence will increase over time (represented by the arrow at the top). (b) If  Rrem
0
< 1, then the prevalence
equation is negative for all  positive prevalence. There is  one non-negative steady state, i* = 0, which is stable. Note that when urem = 0, R
rem
0
= R0 .
that require a lot  of labour, time or machinery to detect infected plant inputs. We suspect that this is often true for bacteria, viruses and
such with no clear symptoms in infected inputs, which need expensive and potentially time-consuming tests to  detect infected inputs.
Putting this all together, we  have six different cases, three of which are where the disease is not particular infectious (which will
collectively be known as Scenario 1) and three of which consider a  highly infectious disease (collectively known as Scenario 2). A summary
of all six Scenarios, including results, is in Table 1.
3. Results
3.1. Long term disease dynamics
3.1.1. Perfect restriction (p(uins) =  0)
In the absence of the removal of infected plants (i.e. urem =  0), we have two cases: (1) R0 < 1: In this case, on  average, a  single infected plant
infects less than one susceptible plant over the lifetime of the infected plant and hence the disease will die out eventually. Consequently,
the only stable state is  the disease-free state and thus the disease cannot become endemic (i* = 0) (Fig.  3(b)). (2) R0 >  1: Here, a single
infected plant infects more than one susceptible over the lifetime of the infection and hence the disease will spread out from any single
introduction. Hence, the only stable steady state is  the endemic steady state i∗ = 1 − 1R0
and thus any introduction will result in the disease
being endemic (Fig. 3(a)).
In the presence of the removal of infected plants (i.e. urem > 0), the results are similar to the absence of removal, except the threshold
between a disease-free nursery and an endemic disease in the nursery is  based on value of Rrem
0
=
R0
1+urem
. For Rrem
0
> 1, for any introduction
of disease, the disease will invade and approach the steady state i∗ = 1 − 1
Rrem
0
(Fig. 3(a)). For Rrem
0
< 1,  the disease will not become endemic
from any single introduction (Fig. 3(b)).
Now, for urem > 0,  we  have that R
rem
0
<  R0.  Thus, the disease will find it harder to  survive as infected plants have less time in the nursery
to infect other plants because of removal. In  particular, if the removal effort (urem) is sufficiently large (urem > R0− 1), we can reduce R
rem
0
below 1 and consequently rid the nursery of the disease in the long run.
3.1.2. Imperfect restriction (p(uins) = p >  0)
With imperfect restriction, the disease will always persist in  the nursery plant stock to some level (Fig. 4). There is always only one
steady state that is non-negative,
i∗ =
R0 − 1 − (1 −  p)urem +
√
(R0 − 1 − (1  − p)urem)
2
+  4pR0
2R0
,  (11)
and it is always stable. The lack of a disease-free steady state is due to the constant inflow of infected plants into the system. In particular,
di
d
= p > 0  at i  = 0 and thus disease prevalence will always increase when starting with a disease-free nursery.
Despite the disease always persisting in the nursery, we wish to distinguish between two  cases. If R
p
0
=
R0
1+urem(1−p)
> 1 (Fig. 4(a)),
the disease spreads through the plant stock like before. Notice that R0 > R
p
0
>  Rrem
0
. This is  because the removal control is only effective
(1 − p) × 100% of the time, since p × 100% of the time  in  the removing infected is replaced by another infected. In particular, if p = 0, R
p
0
= Rrem
0
,
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Fig. 4. Imperfect restriction (p >  0). (a) Rp
0
=
R0
1+urem(1−p)
> 1 and (b)  Rp
0
=
R0
1+urem(1−p)
< 1. For both figures have only one steady state that is stable; there is  no  disease-free
steady  state unlike the case with p  =  0.
Table 2
Summary of constant control.
Endemic Disease-free
Perfect restriction, no removal R0 >  1  R0 < 1
Perfect restriction with removal Rrem
0
> 1 Rrem
0
< 1
Imperfect restriction Always Never
Here, Rrem
0
=
R0
1+urem
.
whereas for p =  1,  R
p
0
= R0.  Consequently, imperfect restriction undermines the removal control. In particular, if R
rem
0
> 1, the disease would
persist without any infected inputs (as shown in the previous subsection for perfect restriction). If
R0
1+urem(1−p)
< 1 (Fig. 4(b)); the disease
does not spread effectively within the nursery and instead its persistence in the nursery is  dependent on constant introduction of infected
plant inputs into the nursery.
The disease dynamics for the imperfect restriction are essentially logistic growth with an additional constant introduction of infected
plants. In particular, Fig. 4(a) can be seen as a  shifted and transformed version of the logistic growth in Fig. 3(a), which results in the loss of
the disease-free steady state and an increase in  the endemic steady state. Likewise, Fig. 4(b) can be seen as a  shifted version of  the ‘negative
logistic growth’ in Fig. 3(b), where the disease-free steady state becomes an endemic steady state.
Table 2 summarises the results about when the disease is  endemic in the nursery for both the perfect and imperfect restriction.
3.2. Optimal management: Analytical results
Working with the prevalence steady state, we seek to find the optimal combination of removal and restriction, urem and uins that
minimises the costs of the plant disease at the nursery:
Q = (L + Curem)i
∗ +  uins = (L + Curem)
M  +
√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
2R0
+ uins (12)
where M(uins, urem)  =  R0− 1 − (1 −  p(uins))urem. Note, M is  fundamentally linked with R
p
0
with equivalent threshold properties: M = 0 corre-
sponds with R
p
0
= 1,  M  > 0 corresponds with R
p
0
> 1 and M <  0 corresponds with R
p
0
< 1.
To find the combination of urem and uins that minimise Q, we need to consider the partial derivatives of Q to  find internal and boundary
minima. When optimal prevention and control policies are interior they satisfy the first order conditions:
∂Q
∂urem
= MCrem − MBrem = 0 (13)
∂Q
∂uins
= MCins − MBins = 0 (14)
where
MBrem =
(L + Curem)(1 −  p(uins))
2R0
(
1 +
M√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
MCrem =
C
2R0
(
M +
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
MBins = −
(L  + Curem)
∂p(uins)
∂uins
2R0
(
urem +
Murem + 2R0√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
)
MCins = 1
As expected, Eq.  (13) (Eq. (14)) requires a nursery owner to allocate resources to removal (restriction) until the last dollar spent on
removal (restriction) equals the marginal benefits gained in terms of reduction in infection costs. The analysis of the properties of  local
and global minima for removal (Eq. (13)) and restriction (Eq. (14)), can be found in  Appendices A and B,  respectively.
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Looking at Eqs. (13) and (14) and incorporating the results found in  Appendices A and B,  we have the following:
• With respect to removal, if MBrem>MCrem at urem =  0 then MBrem>MCrem for all urem and thus urem = uremmax is  the global minimum with
respect to urem.
• If MBrem<MCrem at urem = uremmax then MBrem<MCrem for all admissible urem and thus urem = 0, i.e. no  removal effort, is the global minimum
with respect to urem.
• The only other case with respect to urem is that there exists a  value of urem ∈ (0, uremmax)  such that MBrem =MCrem, and this internal solution
is a local maximum. Both urem =  0 and urem = uremmax are local minima with respect to urem. One of these will be the global minimum with
respect to urem and direct comparison of the values of Q at these local minima is  required.
• With respect to restriction, if MBins<MCins at uins = 0,  then MBins<MCins for all uins > 0 and thus Q  is minimised at uins = 0,  i.e. no restriction
is optimal.
• Conversely, if MBins>MCins for uins = 0 (for fixed urem), then there is a  value of uins >  0 such that MBins =MCins (i.e. a level  of restriction where
the marginal benefit is  equal to the marginal cost), and this value is the global minimum with respect to uins, i.e. moderate restriction is
optimal.
• One can analyse whether removal and restriction work together as complements or as substitutes by analysing ∂
2
Q
∂uins∂urem
.  For comple-
ments, ∂
2
Q
∂uins∂urem
<  0 (since Q  represents costs, not  profit or utility) and ∂
2
Q
∂uins∂urem
> 0 for substitutes. The expression for ∂
2
Q
∂uins∂urem
is
complex and can be either sign. In particular, if M and R0 are large and urem is zero, then
∂2Q
∂uins∂urem
< 0 and thus restriction and removal
are complements; whereas, if urem is large and thus M is large and negative,
∂2Q
∂uins∂urem
> 0, making restriction and removal substitutes.
From this and by looking at Eqs. (13) and (14),  we can establish some rules of thumb. Firstly, by looking at Eq. (14), we  can see that
increasing L and/or C,  will increase the marginal benefits in damages avoided and thus generally results in higher restriction (in particular,
it never leads to lower levels of restriction). Secondly, looking at Eq. (13),  we can see that increasing L and C proportionally results in  no
change in whether urem =  0 or urem = uremmax are optimal. Consequently, the values of L and C themselves have no impact on the optimal
strategy for removal, only the ratio between L and C (in other words, the nursery owner would apply the same effort if losses for an infected
plant were $1 and removal costs $1 as $10 losses with $10 removal costs, it is just a  matter of scale). This is not the case for uins,  since both,
revenue losses and removal costs are compared with the cost of restriction.
The effects of R0 and the parameters in p(uins) on Eqs. (13) and (14) are not  straightforward, partly because they are also included within
M, although the presence of
∂p(uins)
∂uins
in MBins suggests that increasing the cost-effectiveness of restriction, d, increases MBins around uins = 0,
making restriction measures more likely.
3.3. Optimal management: numerical solutions
Table 1 provides a  summary of the results for all the scenarios analysed.
3.3.1. Scenario 1: low infectiousness
Scenario 1 represents cases of diseases that  would not persist in  the nursery without the constant introduction of infected plant materials.
First we will consider the baseline case where L  =  10 and d = 1 (Scenario 1a), before focusing on the effects a  reduction in L (to L = 5) has on
the optimal solution (Scenario 1b) and then consider the effect of reducing the effectiveness per dollar in restriction effort d to  0.3  (Scenario
1c).
In Scenario 1a (Fig. 5(a)), we have  that the marginal benefit of removal is always greater than the marginal cost(
since ∂Q
∂urem
< 0 at urem = 0
)
.  Consequently, the optimal removal is maximum removal urem = uremmax.  This is to  be expected, since remov-
ing an infected plant prevents not only losses from that infected plants (which are assumed to be equal to the removal cost, L =  C) but
also losses from secondary infections. Given that R0 >  p(uins) this additional loss from secondary infections is considerably greater than the
potential loss that could result from the possibility of buying infected inputs when replacing plants that were subject to  removal.
In Fig. 5(a) and all other contour plots, the optimal level of restriction is determined by the line MBins=MCins. For Scenario 1a (Fig. 5(a)),
with no removal effort, the optimal level of restriction is around uins = 1.2. As the nursery increases its capacity to  remove infected plants,
it slowly reduces the optimal level of restriction.
Next, we consider the case where the revenue losses from infection are considerably lower (Scenario 1b, Fig. 5(b)). Reducing the revenue
losses from infection from L =  10 to L =  5 has made removal less viable. It  is better to  leave an infected plant in the nursery, because the
costs of removing and replacing an infected plant is too expensive relative to  the revenue loss associated to its lower net price.
Now, in contrast to  Scenario 1a, Scenario 1c (Fig. 5(c)) simulates a  situation where restriction is  more costly. This is  represented
by decreasing d from 1 to  0.3 and consequently spending an extra unit in  restriction results in a reduction in  infected inputs of
(1 − exp−0.3) * 100%(≈26%), considerably worse than the 63% in Scenario 1a. This decrease in  d  has shifted the optimal restriction line
where MBins=MCins to the left, in  this case the line is  now to the left of the y-axis and thus beyond the realms of reality, and consequently
restriction has become inviable. Thus the optimal strategy in Scenario 1c is maximum removal with no restriction (Fig. 5(c)).
3.3.2. Scenario 2: high infectiousness
Increasing the basic reproduction number from R0 = 0.5 (Scenario 1) to R0 = 5 (Scenario 2) increases the complexity of the results.
When a disease is  highly infectious, any small introduction of infected plants will spread the disease through the nursery quickly.
Consequently, investing in  restriction does not prevent the disease going through the plants growing in the nursery. However, restriction
does have a mild effect on disease prevalence when prevalence in the nursery is high as the ‘cleaner’ inputted plants that replace those
leaving the nursery will have a mild rinsing effect. Thus, without removal effort, restriction is  often not viable (i.e. no  restriction is  optimal)
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Fig. 5. Contour plots of Q with respect to both removal and restriction for (a)  Scenario 1a, (b) Scenario 1b and (c) Scenario 1c. Red regions are the regions of lowest costs
whereas blue regions signify highest costs. The black solid line represents MBins=MCins (there are no lines for removal in this Scenario). Black dots are  local minima, white
dots  are local maxima and grey dots are saddle points (points on the right boundary are local maxima/saddle point if we  limit uins to  regions in these figures). R0 , L and d
are  given in Table 1. Other parameters: C  =  10, a = 0.2 and b = 0. (For  interpretation of the references to colour in this figure, the reader is  referred to the web version of this
article.)
when the disease is  highly infectious. This is particularly the case here when contrasting the viable restriction in Scenario 1a (Fig. 5(a)
where R0 = 0.5) and the inviable restriction in  Scenario 2a (Fig. 6(a)) when there is no removal.
In Scenario 2a  (Fig. 6(a)) there are up to two local minima. We  know from the analytical results that optimal removal is  either urem = 0
or urem = uremmax. Consequently we can argue about the importance of uremmax by varying urem = uremmax in the contour plots, following the
MBins=MCins line. If the nursery capacity to  remove is small, in particular such that  uremmax is below the intersection of the MBins=MCins
and MBrem=MCrem curves, then there is only one local (and thus global) minimum, which is to do nothing and let the disease take its
course. If uremmax is beyond the intersection, then there are two  local minima, the aforementioned ‘do  nothing’ and urem =  uremmax with the
corresponding restriction level given by MBins=MCins.  The global minimum is  one of these two local minima and which one depends on the
value of uremmax;  if  uremmax is small enough that the contour is either blue or  green (below uremmax≈ 3.5) then ‘do nothing’ is optimal, whereas
beyond uremmax≈ 3.5 where the contours are yellow to red, then maximum removal (urem =  uremmax) is  the optimal strategy. Consequently,
there is a great range of values uremmax where the optimal solution is to  ‘do nothing’, that it is futile to try and control the disease without
being able to really get on top of it.
One particularly interesting result in Scenario 2a (Fig. 6(a)) is the kink that occurs in the MBins=MCins curve. This kink occurs indistin-
guishably close to  R
p
0
= 1 since the kink occurs around where the MBins=MCins and R
p
0
=  1 curves intersect. Below this kink, we  have that
increasing level of removal is  linked with increasing level of restriction, i.e. removal and restrictions are complements. This occurs since
restriction improves the effectiveness of removal as it reduces the chances that an infected plant, which has been removed, is replaced
by another infected plant. However, above the kink, we have that increasing level of removal results in  a decrease in  the optimal level
of restriction, i.e. they are substitutes. This agrees with the final bullet point of the analytical results, where restriction and removal are
complements when R0 is large and urem is  small, whereas restriction and removal are substitutes when urem is substantially larger than R0.
Going from Scenario 2a  to 2b (Fig. 6(b)), there is a  reduction in  the loss in  revenue from selling an infected plant from L =  10 to  L = 1
(note that this is a considerably smaller revenue loss than in  Scenario 1b). The effect of this small revenue loss in  the optimal effort of
controlling the disease is relatively minor with respect to  Scenario 2a; MBins=MCins has shifted a little to the left, and thus the optimal
level of restriction is  reduced everywhere and MBrem=MCrem has shifted a  bit to  the right and a little up. The consequence of the move in
MBrem=MCrem is that removal is  also less viable everywhere. In particular, the intersection between these two lines that separates the two
local minima has shifted up, increasing the region where there is  only one local minimum; and consequently, ‘do nothing’ has become the
optimal control irrespective to  the value of uremmax.
Notice that L has to be really small to achieve the result above. For L = 5, the global minimum is maximum removal as long as uremmax is
sufficiently above the kink around R
p
0
= 1 (figure not given, use Fig. 6(a)  as guide). Conversely, a large increase in revenue losses, L, is  needed
to exclude ‘do nothing’ as a  local optimal minimum; first, optimal restriction expenditure becomes positive for zero removal around L = 25
(i.e. MBins=MCins intercepts the x-axis), and this ‘restriction only state’ becomes a  local minimum. The ‘restriction only state’ remains a
local minimum while the curves representing MBins=MCins and MBrem=MCrem intercept. This intercept disappears around L =  45, beyond
which there is  no ‘zero-removal’ local minimum. This means that even for large revenue losses, if the nursery capacity to  remove is small
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Fig. 6. Contour plots of profit Q  with respect to both removal and restriction for (a)  Scenario 2a, (b)  Scenario 2b  and (c) Scenario 2c. Red regions are the regions of lowest costs
whereas blue regions signify highest costs. The black lines represent MBins=MCins and MBrem=MCrem whereas the grey line represents the values of (uins , urem) that correspond
to  Rp
0
= 1. The dots have the same meaning as Fig. 5(a). R0 , L and d are given in Table 1. Other parameters are the same as Fig. 5.  (For interpretation of the references to colour
in  this figure, the reader is referred to the web  version of this article.)
(uremmax small) then the nursery is very likely to  be in the region where no expenditure in  removal is  optimal. This is  because the disease
will still spread through the nursery since R
p
0
is still considerably larger than 1, making removal efforts futile.
Now, consider the case where restriction is  less cost-effective as d is decreased to 0.3 (Scenario 2c,  Fig. 6(c)). This decrease has a  relatively
minor effect on the removal line MBrem=MCrem in Fig.  6(c), the line keeps the same intercept with the y-axis and it is flatter than in  Fig. 6(a).
This is predictable since decreasing cost-effectiveness means that more needs to be spent in restriction in  order to  have the same effect
in the reduction of the probability of buying infected inputs. Likewise, the line of MBins=MCins has (a) a  higher intercept with the y-axis,
making restriction less worthy if there is  low removal, and (b) at the kink the expenditure on restriction has increased. The latter effect is
due to the reduction in the cost-effectiveness (essentially an increase in the price of a 50% reduction in  infected inputs) which does reduce
restriction effort, but it does increase total spending on restriction.
4.  Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed the prevention and control management options available to a  nursery owner in  order to minimise
the impacts of an infectious disease that may  spread within the nursery. To this end, we derived a bioeconomic model of a  plant nursery,
where the manager can opt either to  restrict the proportion of infected plant material coming into the nursery (prevention), or  remove
infected plants within the nursery (control), or a combination of both strategies. We assume that there is  an upper limit on removal effort.
Our analytical results show that (a) if infected inputs are always coming into the nursery, the disease would persist in  the nursery, and will
approach a unique endemic steady state (Section 3.1.2 and Fig. 4); (b) the optimal removal is  either maximum removal (i.e. the upper limit
in removal efforts given the nursery’s capacity) or no removal, as long as restriction efforts are optimally allocated, i.e. where the marginal
cost of restriction equals its marginal benefit in terms of disease damages avoided (Section 3.2);  (c) optimal restriction expenditure increase
with both the revenue losses for selling mature infected plants and costs of removal; while maximal removal is more likely to be optimal
if either revenue infection losses increase or removal costs decrease (Section 3.2); (d) since any removed infected plant stock needs to  be
replaced buying new plant inputs, which could potentially be infected, the manager can increase the effectiveness of removal effort by
increasing restriction effort (see expressions of R
p
0
and  i* in Section 3.1.2).
The numerical analysis of the Scenarios (summarised in  Table 1)  with varying conditions in the level of infectiousness of the disease,
damages to the nursery, and cost-effectiveness of management efforts, highlights three relevant results for private biosecurity decisions.
First, results indicate that it is  optimal to  spend on maximum removal efforts unless the revenue losses from selling infected mature plants
are considerable lower than the cost of removal (especially for highly infectious diseases, e.g. Scenario 2).
Secondly, if the capacity to remove infected plants is very limited, due for example to temporal or monetary constrains, it may  be
optimal to ‘do nothing’ (again, particularly for highly infectious diseases, Scenario 2). It  is only worth removing infected plants if the efforts
applied can limit the expansion of the disease through secondary infections within the nursery, otherwise removal resources could be
waste; it is not worthwhile removing an infected plant if the replaced plant will likely become infected. The private benefits of  removal
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efforts in curbing the disease have therefore threshold properties. Benefits can only be achieved once at least a  minimum amount has been
contributed to their production. This property on removal efforts is expected to affect the probability of cooperating (e.g. Sandler, 2004;
Touza and Perrings, 2011), when strategic decisions among private agents is  relevant to limit the probability of outbreaks (e.g. Hennessy,
2008; Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2015).
A third result is the finding of synergies between restriction and removal strategies, which are determined by the reproduction number,
i.e. how contagious a disease is and could be spread through trade. This contributes to previous existing literature that only focus on
substitutionary effects between prevention and control. For example, Olson and Roy (2005) examine the conditions under which the
optimal policy relies solely on either prevention or control. Kim et al. (2006) examine the optimal combination of pre-discovery prevention,
post-discovery prevention and post-discovery control where the discovery time is stochastic, and find that post-discovery prevention and
control are substitutes. Leung et al. (2005) consider that if there is expensive control activities, this reduces social welfare at the post-
invasion state, and consequently higher social welfare can be  achieved from avoiding invasion, and substituting control by  prevention
efforts. Similarly, Finnoff et al. (2007) conclude that a risk averse agent would substitute more prevention expenditures with control
policies when compared to a  risk neutral agent. Here, we found that the optimal level of restriction is  complementary with removal efforts
if  the disease is beyond the nursery owner’s ability to  limit its spread. The underlying reason for this is that, restriction measures may  not  be
very effective in the case of highly infectious diseases (Scenario 2), since some infected plants materials will always get past the restriction
regime, and once infected plants are in the nursery the disease will spread fast within the nursery. In those situations, if the manager
increases the level of effort in  removing infected plants, the disease becomes more manageable, and consequently making expenditures in
restriction measures more effective. In addition, increased efforts on restriction makes also removal more effective, reducing the probability
of buying infected inputs when the nursery owner has to buy new stock to replace those infected plants that were removed. Consequently,
removal and restriction efforts are complementary for highly infected diseases.
This phenomenon where ‘prevention’ and ‘cure’ are complementary has been found in  the human health literature in Hey and Patel
(1983) and Hennessy (2008). Hennessy (2008) argue that  for ‘prevention’ and ‘cure’ being complements is  that increasing prevention
reduces the chance that cured individuals become sick again and thus improving the long term benefit of curing sick individuals. This argu-
ment is analogous to  the reasons that can explain why restriction improves the effectiveness of removal in Scenario 2, as the replacement
of a removed infected plant with an infected plant can be seen as (instantaneous) reinfection.
We also show that this complementary relationship between prevention and control continues as removal level increase until around
R
p
0
= 1. Beyond this point the disease no longer is able to spread through the nursery and instead relies on the constant introduction of
infected plant inputs to  persist in the nursery. In this case, the disease could be  manageable through the removal programme, and the
nursery owner can choose whether to remove it once it is  in  the nursery or prevent it from entering the nursery. This means, restriction
and removal efforts are substitutes, akin to  the classic ‘prevention vs cure’ argument.
However, it should be  noted that the analysis in  this paper is  based on the long term dynamics of the disease and decision making, thus
our work fits more the endemic stage of an infection with the nursery being subject to continual invasion pressure. Consequently, it neglects
the epidemic/invasion stage, and uncertain benefits from delaying the spread of the disease through prevention and/or surveillance during
this stage (e.g. Haight and Polasky, 2010; Mehta et al., 2007). Moreover, we also recognise that many nurseries work on a shorter term
basis than used in  this model. For example, some nurseries are seasonal and only have a  generation or two  of plants in the nursery for
one season before an annual reset of the nursery, with new plants stock. In this case, a  steady state might not be appropriate analysis as
not enough time has occurred for a  steady state to  be reached. Following the above literature, in  cases like those in  Scenario 2 with highly
infectious diseases, restriction and removal may  be more viable in the early stages of disease introduction (unlike the long term) since they
can delay the inevitable disease spreading through the nursery. However, even in shorter time-scales, equilibrium-based analysis form a
strong baseline for understanding optimal decisions.
In the model derivation process we assumed that the nursery stock is fixed (i.e. the nursery is  always full). This is not always true,
especially if seasonal effects (like weather or  seasonal demand) occur or if  the nursery owner reduces the size of the nursery as a  disease
management tool. During periods with a reduced nursery stock, the basic reproductive number R0 is reduced (since the disease is  density
dependent) as is the cost-effectiveness of restriction, ‘d’. The reduction in R0 means the disease will spread less within the nursery and thus
is easier to control by removal. Consequently, the constant full nursery assumption used in this paper gives an upper limit to the extent
of the disease will spread and thus a  worst case scenario in terms of uncontrolled damages from a pathogen. On top of that, the reduction
on R0 from a lower N reduces the range of urem where restriction and removal are complements. On the other hand, the reduction in  the
cost-effectiveness of restriction would result in a  less stringent restriction regime (i.e. an increase in the proportion of infected plant inputs,
p(uins)), akin to what is  found when comparing Scenarios 1a and 2a  with Scenarios 1c and 2c.
In this paper, we have assumed the disease is an SI disease, i.e. each plant is either susceptible or infected and there is  no recovery
from the disease. This was for simplicity and generality. However, many plant diseases have recovery, latency, asymptomatic infection and
immunity, as well as free-living stages in the environment (i.e. in the soil  or water). The presence of asymptomatic and latent infected plant
inputs undermines the owner’s ability to  restrict infected inputs coming into the nursery since identifying infected plants material inputs
becomes much more complex or even impossible if no symptoms of infection or clear evidence of pathogens are present. In addition, our
analysis only focuses on diseases that can only enter the nursery via infected plant material inputs (i.e. though plant trade). However, for
many different nurseries, pathogens and pests get into the nursery through a  number of different pathways. In particular, contaminated
water is often the reason for Phytophthora and other pathogens getting into plant nurseries (Hong and Moorman, 2005,  and references
therein). We  suspect that in  this situation, restriction strategies that  focus on inspecting plant inputs would have a limited effect on
preventing the diseases, which would reduce their cost-effectiveness and therefore their optimal level of provision.
The level of restriction in this paper depends greatly on the choice of the function p(uins), the proportion of infected plant material inputs
that are infected for a  given level of restriction. In this paper, we used an exponentially decreasing function to obtain numerical results
since it was the simplest function that satisfies the desired properties of p(uins)  (i.e. which, in  short, is  monotonic decreasing of uins).  This
function has the property that the first dollar spent on restriction is  always the most effective, and that each dollar spent has a smaller effect
on p(uins)  than the previous dollar. This property would not necessarily be appropriate in  several cases. For example, functions where a
small investment in restriction has little effect and a  substantial investment that more has to  spent for a  restriction regime to start to have
a noticeable effect on the proportion of infected plant materials coming in  could be more appropriate if substantial funds are  needed for
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effective levels of knowledge, labour, machinery and skills to be  maintained. A suggested simple function that could provide useful incite
into management satisfies this property is (a − b)exp
−du2
ins + b (in which case the most cost-effective level of restriction is  at uins = (2d)
−1/2).
Finally, note that this paper deals with one disease of concern for the nursery owner to control. Generally, a  nursery owner has a
multitude of diseases to be concerned about. For example, the tomato Solanum lycopersicum is  known to  be a host for over 500 different
pests and pathogens (CABI, 2015). Likewise, a  nursery can have many pathogens present. For example, at least 13 different species of
Phytophthora were found in the irrigation water at three nurseries in northern Germany in 1995 (Themann et al., 2002; Brasier, 2008).
Likewise, in Bavaria in  2002, there were five different species of Phytophthora found in the soil around a single open-planted alder seedling
(T. Jung, LWF, D-85354 Freising, personal communication cited in Brasier, 2008). With a multitude of diseases to manage, a  common
optimal strategy on restriction and removal would be needed, a  strategy that would likely differ from the strategy of each of the diseases
in isolation.
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Appendix A. Optimal solution with respect to urem: ‘all or nothing’
To find out what the optimal solutions with respect to urem,  we need to investigate:
∂Q
∂urem
= (L +  Curem)
∂M
∂urem
+
2M ∂M
∂urem
2
√
M2+4R0p(uins)
2R0
+ C
M +
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
2R0
= 0, (A.1)
where M(uins, urem)  =  R0−  1 − (1 −  p(uins))urem.  First, we need to manipulate this into something more manageable.
∂Q
∂urem
= −
(L + Curem)(1 − p(uins))
2R0
(
1 +
M√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
)
+
C
2R0
(
M +
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
(A.2)
= −
C
2R0
((
L
C
+ urem
)
(1 −  p(uins))
(
1 +
M√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
−
(
M +
√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
))
(A.3)
= −
C
2R0
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
(((
L
C
+ urem
)
(1  − p(uins)) − M
)  (√
M2 + 4R0p(uins) + M
)
−  4R0p(uins)
)
(A.4)
Consequently, solutions of ∂Q
∂urem
=  0 are solutions of
((
L
C + urem
)
(1 − p(uins))  − M
)
(
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins) + M) − 4R0p(uins) = 0.  Now, if
such solutions exist and are admissible, we need to  find out if one of these solution is a  maximum with respect urem.  To do so, we need to
look at the second derivative.
∂
2
Q
∂u2rem
= −
C
2R0
∂M
∂uins
∂
∂M
(
1√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
) =0︷ ︸︸  ︷(((
L
C
+ urem
)
(1 − p(uins)) −  M
)  (√
M2 + 4R0p(uins) + M
)
−  4R0p(uins)
)
−
C
2R0
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
(
(1 − p(uins))
(√
M2 + 4R0p(uins) + M
)
−
∂M
∂uins
(
1 +
M√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
+
(
L
C
+ urem
)
(1  − p(uins))
∂M
∂uins
∂
∂M
(√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
))
(A.5)
= −
C
2R0
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
(
2(1 − p(uins))
(√
M2 + 4R0p(uins) +  M
)
− (1 − p(uins))
((
L
C
+ urem
)
(1 − p(uins))  − M
)(
1 +
M√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
))
(A.6)
= −
C(1 −  p(uins))
2R0(M2 + 4R0p(uins))
(
2
(
M2 + 4R0p(uins) + M
√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
)
−
((
L
C
+ urem
)
(1 −  p(uins)) − M
)(√
M2 +  4R0p(uins) + M
)) (A.7)
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=  −
C(1 − p(uins))
2R0(M2 + 4R0p(uins))
(
2
(
M2 + 2R0p(uins) +  M
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
−
=0︷ ︸︸  ︷((((
L
C
+ urem
)
(1 − p(uins)) −  M
)  (√
M2 + 4R0p(uins) + M
))
− 4R0p(uins)
)⎞⎟⎟⎠
(A.8)
= −
C(1 − p(uins))
R0(M2 + 4R0p(uins))
(
M2 +  2R0p(uins) + M
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
(A.9)
If M > 0, then ∂
2
Q
∂u2rem
< 0 and thus all internal solutions are local maxima with respect to urem. It is  not completely clear if this is  the case
for M < 0 so instead look to find the value of M where M2 +  2R0p(uins) +  M
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)  has its minimum. So we look at the properties
of solutions of ∂
∂M
(
M2 +  2R0p(uins) +  M
√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
)
= 0.
∂
∂M
(
M2 +  2R0p(uins) + M
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
=  2M +
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins) +
M2√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
(A.10)
=
2√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
(
M2 + 2R0p(uins) + M
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
=  0 (A.11)
Solutions of this satisfy M = −
M2+2R0p(uins)√
M2+4R0p(uins)
. Substituting this into M2 +  2R0p(uins) + M
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins) gives:
−
M2 + 2R0p(uins)√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
(
−
M2 + 2R0p(uins)√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
+
√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
+  2R0p(uins)
= −
M2 + 2R0p(uins)
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
(
−(M2 +  2R0p(uins))  + M
2 +  4R0p(uins)
)
+ 2R0p(uins)
= 2R0p(uins)
(
1  −
M2 + 2R0p(uins)
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
> 0
(A.12)
and thus M2 + 2R0p(uins) +  M
√
M2 +  4R0p(uins) > 0 always and thus
∂2Q
∂u2rem
> 0 and thus internal solutions are always local maxima with
respect to urem. As there is  no internal minimum with respect to  urem, the global minimum must occur on the boundary, either at urem = 0
or urem = uremmax. If
∂Q
∂urem
< 0 at urem =  0 then urem = 0 is a  local (global) maximum and urem =  uremmax is the global minimum. Conversely, if
∂Q
∂urem
> 0 at urem = uremmax then urem = uremmax is a local (global) maximum and thus urem =  0 is a  global minimum. If
∂Q
∂urem
> 0 at urem = 0 and
∂Q
∂urem
< 0 at urem = uremmax, then you have must compare Q for urem = 0 and urem =  uremmax since both are local minima.
Appendix B. Optimal control with respect to restriction uins:  ‘do something or do nothing’
We  need to find out the global minimum with respect to  restriction uins by analysing:
∂Q
∂uins
= (L + Curem)
∂M
∂uins
+
2M ∂M
∂uins
+4R0
∂p(uins)
∂uins
2
√
M2+4R0p(uins)
2R0
+ 1 =  0. (B.1)
where M(uins,  urem)  = R0− 1 − (1 −  p(uins))urem.  First, we will look at the second partial derivative to see if
∂Q
∂uins
is an increasing or decreasing
function of uins:
∂
2
Q
∂u2
ins
=
∂
2
p(uins)
∂u2
ins
(L + Curem)
2R0
(
urem +
Murem + 2R0√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
)
+
(
∂p(uins)
∂uins
)2
(L + Curem)
2R0
⎛
⎜⎝−2R0(Murem + 2R0)
(M2 +  4R0p(uins))
3
2
⎞
⎟⎠ (B.2)
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=
∂
2
p(uins)
∂u2
ins
L + Curem
2R0
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
urem +
(Murem + 2R0)(M
2 + 4R0p(uins)) − 2R0
(
∂p
∂uins
)2
∂
2
p
∂u2
ins
(Murem + 2R0)
(M2 + 4R0p(uins))
3
2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(B.3)
=
∂
2
p(uins)
∂u2
ins
L + Curem
2R0
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
urem +
M2 + 4R0p(uins) − 2R0
(
∂p
∂uins
)2
∂
2
p
∂u2
ins
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
Murem + 2R0√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)︸ ︷︷  ︸
always  >−urem
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(B.4)
Now, since we do  not have sufficient knowledge on the properties of ∂
2
p
∂u2
ins
in  general, we  will continue with p(uins) = b +  (a  − b) exp(−duins).
Thus ∂p
∂uins
= −d(a − b)  exp(−duins) = −d(p(uins) − b) and
∂2p
∂u2
ins
= −d ∂p
∂uins
=  d2(a − b) exp(−duins) =  d
2(p(uins) −  b). Armed with this, we have:
∂
2
Q
∂u2
ins
=
(L +  Curem)d2(p(uins) −  b)
2R0
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝urem +
∈  (0,1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
M2 + 2R0(p(uins) + b)
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
︷  ︸︸  ︷
Murem + 2R0√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
always >−urem
︸ ︷︷  ︸
>0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ (B.5)
> 0 when L + Curem > 0 (B.6)
Firstly, we note that if L +  Curem ≤  0 (which could be true if L < 0), there are no internal solutions from possible for Eq. (14) from the main
text and we have ∂Q
∂uins
= 0 is  monotonically increasing to −1. Hence, ∂Q
∂uins
< 0 always and thus zero restriction is always the best (a disease
that is beneficial should not be restricted). For L +  Curem > 0, we  have that
∂Q
∂uins
is monotonically increasing (to 1 as uins→ ∞).  In  other words,
increasing restriction has even diminishing returns, reducing the marginal benefit, whereas the marginal cost remains the same. Given we
have that ∂Q
∂uins
is monotonically increasing to 1 (and is continuous), we know that there exists one and only one admissible solution with
respect to uins (for fixed urem)  if
∂Q
∂uins
< 0 at uins =  0 and that this solution is a global minimum with respect to uins,  i.e. the optimal control
involves some restriction. Otherwise, ∂Q
∂uins
≥  0 at uins = 0, there is no internal solution and the global minimum with respect to uins is at
uins = 0, i.e. no restriction is optimal.
If such solutions do not exist within admissible controls (urem ∈  [0, uremmax] and uins ≥ 0), we need to pick the minimising values on the
boundary, i.e. if ∂Q
∂uins
> 0 at uins = 0,  then either uins =  0 and uins =∞ are  the global maximum. However, since
∂Q
∂uins
→ 1 as uins→ ∞ (because
p(uins)  is converging to  b and thus
∂p(uins)
∂uins
→ 0, uins =∞ is always a local maximum and thus uins =  0 is the global minimum, i.e. the cost
minimising strategy, when ∂Q
∂uins
> 0 at uins = 0.
Appendix C. Linking dynamic and stationary approaches
Taking Eq. (6) and following the rescaling and rearrangement that occur between Eq. (7) and (9) leads to:
min
uins,urem
∫ Tˆ
0
e−rˆt ((L + Curem)i + uins)dt (C.1)
where Tˆ = Tı and rˆ  = r
ı
(henceforth, we will drop these hats for simplicity, being consistent with what was done in the main text). First,
we establish and analyse the Hamiltonian of Eqs. (9) and (10).  This Hamiltonian is:
H = e−rt ((−L − Curem)i  −  uins)+  (p(uins)(1  + uremi) −  i − uremi  + R0(1 − i)i) . (C.2)
Consequently, the adjoint equation is:
d
dt
= −
∂H
∂i
= −(e−rt(−L −  Curem) + (p(uins)urem − 1 − urem + R0(1 − 2i))). (C.3)
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The  optimality conditions for uins and urem are:
∂H
∂uins
= −e−rt + 
(
∂p(uins)
∂uins
(1  + uremi)
)
=  0 (C.4)
and
∂H
∂urem
= i((p(uins)  −  1) − Ce
−rt) = 0, (C.5)
respectively.
To link the solutions in  this paper to those of this Hamiltonian, we will assume an infinite time interval, and treat urem,  uins as constants.
On top of this, we will insert the steady state value of i* from Eq.  (11) given from the population dynamics. Rearranging (C.4) gives:
  =
e−rt(
∂p(uins)
∂uins
(1 +  uremi)
) . (C.6)
Inserting this into (C.3) gives:
d
dt
= e−rt
⎛
⎝L  + Curem + p(uins)urem − 1 −  urem + R0(1 − 2i)
∂p(uins)
∂uins
(1 +  uremi)
⎞
⎠ . (C.7)
From this, using the constant urem, uins and i
* assumption and assuming  =  0 at infinity, gives:
 = −
1
r
e−rt
⎛
⎝L +  Curem + p(uins)urem − 1 −  urem + R0(1 −  2i)
∂p(uins)
∂uins
(1 +  uremi)
⎞
⎠ . (C.8)
Using the two expressions for  (C.6) and (C.8),  we get:
1
∂p(uins)
∂uins
(1 + uremi)
= −
1
r
⎛
⎝L +  Curem + p(uins)urem − 1 − urem + R0(1 −  2i)
∂p(uins)
∂uins
(1 + uremi)
⎞
⎠ . (C.9)
Inserting i∗ =
M+
√
M2+4p(uins)R0
2R0
, where M =  R0− 1 −  (1 − p(uins))urem,  and with a little rearranging, we arrive at:
r  = −
(
(L + Curem)
∂p(uins)
∂uins
(
1 + urem
M +
√
M2 + 4pR0
2R0
)
+
√
M2 + 4pR0
)
.  (C.10)
Dividing everything by −
√
M2 + 4p(uins)R0 and rearranging gives:
−
r√
M2 + 4p(uins)R0
= 1 −
⎛
⎝− (L + Curem) ∂p(uins)∂uins
2R0
(
urem +
Murem + 2R0√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)⎞⎠ .  (C.11)
Notice that the right hand side is dQ
duins
= MC ins − MBins from Eq. (14).  Thus for zero discounting (r =  0),
dQ
duins
=  0 gives the optimal
restriction, whereas for a  positive discounting rate (r >  0), the optimal restriction satisfies dQ
duins
= − r√
M2+4R0p(uins)
. However, since dQ
duins
is
monotonically increasing function, we know that increasing the discount rate (r) would lower the optimal level of restriction. This effect is
very dependent on how long the plant is expected to be in the nursery due to  the time rescaling (i.e. since rˆ = r
ı
).  If the average plant stay
is short (i.e. weeks to months) then this discounting effect is  negligible, whereas for longer period (i.e. years), this term becomes larger,
having more impact on the optimal restriction.
Moving on to  optimal removal, (C.5) is generally never satisfied, and instead the optimal removal is a  ‘bang–bang’ control (i.e. all or
nothing) which is consistent with the static analysis. Consequently, the optimal solution is either urem =  0 or urem =  uremmax,  which depends
on the sign of (p(uins)  − 1) −  Ce
−rt.
To determine the sign, we  will focus on the threshold (p(uins) − 1) − Ce
−rt =  0. Substituting Eq. (C.6) and rearranging gives:
C
∂p(uins)
∂uins
(1  + uremi) =  −(1 − p(uins)). (C.12)
Now, rearranging Eq. (C.9) and inserting the steady state value of i* from Eq. (11) gives
∂p(uins)
∂uins
(1 + uremi)  = −
r +
√
M2 + 4p(uins)R0
L  + Curem
. (C.13)
Substituting this into (C.12) and arranging gives
Cr  = (L + Curem)(1 − p(uins)) −  C
√
M2 +  4p(uins)R0. (C.14)
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Multiplying by −12R0
(
1 + M√
M2+4R0p(uins)
)
we arrive at:
−
rC
2R0
(
1 +
M√
M2 +  4R0p(uins)
)
=
C
2R0
(M  +
√
M2 + 4p(uins)R0)  −
(L +  Curem)(1 − p(uins))
2R0
(
1 +
M√
M2 + 4R0p(uins)
)
. (C.15)
This of condition is analogous with the static problem, with the right hand side  being dQ
durem
= MCrem − MBrem from Eq. (13).
This alone does not give the global optimal since there are two ’s to compare, one where urem =  0,  the other where urem = uremmax.  In
cases where (urem = 0)(p(uins)  − 1) − Ce
−rt < 0 but (urem = uremmax)(p(uins) − 1) − Ce
−rt >  0, a comparison in terms of profit must be  made,
which is analogous to the two local optima solutions found in the static solutions. Again, like with restriction, we have that no discounting
gives the same result, and increasing the discount rate makes urem =  uremmax less likely to be  globally optimal.
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